Tag Archives: bailouts

To Protest or Reform — Who’s Messing with Our Minds?

(photo:  Greece’s P.M. Papandreou and France’s Sarkozy in Davos, Switzerland, recently, managing economic turbulence)
. .
By Marc Seltzer; originally published on March 19, 2010, at care2.com

. .

There is still a strong undercurrent of anger in the United States about bailouts and stimulus spending.  Republicans, and even Democrats and Progressives, have reacted angrily to President Obama and his financial team.  This is significant because President Obama lost political capital on the economic recovery plan, and has far less power now to push though health care, education and financial reforms than he would have absent these actions.

The common critique from the Right is that Mr. Obama is moving in a socialist direction, while from the Left it is that Geithner, Summers, Romer and Bernanke, the U.S. government’s economic chieftains, are corporatist and beholden to the bankers.

More puzzling than the conservative complaints about the administration’s stewardship of the economy, is the Left’s opposition to it.  A significant part of the Democratic party seems to believe that our current leadership is on the side of the wealthy in a new class struggle, and that the government bailouts have effected a transfer of wealth from the little guy to the fat cats.  To be fair, this antagonism towards saving the financial system is in part a more structural distaste for corporate political and legal power — unrelated to recent U.S. government actions.  None-the-less, Obama is now trying to enact reforms in this across-the-spectrum, anti-government political climate.

To challenge the idea that Obama’s actions were pro-bank, pro-corporate, or designed to bail out the fat cats at the expense of the public, I want to compare the European response to the financial crisis with U.S. actions.  European nations, often called “social democracies,” are respected by the American Left and cited as examples for their stronger safety net of worker protections, health care and liberal benefits.

Jean-Claude Trichet, the head of the European Central Bank, equivalent to our Federal Reserve Bank (Ben Bernanke), said recently about American and European government interventions:

“We had to put on the table on both sides of the Atlantic around 25% of taxpayer risk to avoid the Depression, a major Depression, which would have come had we not been that bold.  When I say we, I mean the governments.  Of course, the central banks also have been very bold, in engaging in non conventional measures — the Fed and us [European Central Bank].”  (Bloomberg on Demand, March 12, 2010, from interview with Tom Keene)

What is insightful here is that European governments and related institutions behaved much as the American government did.  As the New York Times reported in early 2009:

“So far, Europe’s largest economies, France, Germany and Britain, have been spared demonstrations. All three governments have introduced huge stimulus measures aimed at spurring employment and protecting banks.

Regardless of the outcome, the three countries will face large budget deficits and higher state borrowing, which economists say will be passed on to taxpayers. And in the case of France and Germany, the governments could find it more difficult to introduce bold reforms at a time of recession.” (New York Times, January 26, 2009.)

To be sure, European nations have faced public protests over the past year, including demonstrations in recent weeks against the Socialist government in Greece.  And modern European nations are a mix of strong state intervention in industry and free markets.  But despite their more left-leaning perspectives, European government actions to save banks and support their nations’ economies with emergency stimulus spending, resemble US approaches.

The underlying reason for this is plain: Healthy economies require healthy banking systems.  The only other option for lawmakers in 2009 would have been to nationalize, through government takeover, the major banks and investment companies.  This would not only have been too radical for a young American President in the first days of his Presidency, but was not favored by European nations, which, despite more Socialist political visions, prefer to keep most individual businesses in the hands of private owners.

It is as much of a stretch to believe that Barack Obama, community-organizer-turned-politician, attained the Presidency in order to embrace the rich and powerful over the little guy, as it is to draw the conclusion that the Socialist and left-leaning governments of Europe transformed in 2009 into standard bearers for corporate and special interests across the Continent.

Why the American Left should find itself so opposed to the positions of both European and American governments requires little guesswork.  The greed, irresponsibility and power in the financial system made the public angry.  The Republicans, with little post-election political power and prospects, turned anti-corporate anger into anti-government anger with some clever “grass roots” anti-Democrat marketing messages.

Now, instead of joining the administration and embracing reforms, many a Democrat flirts with anti-government energy, which is really just self-serving partisan manipulation pushed by the Republican party.

Democratic Congressman Dennis Kucinich, in discussing his last-minute decision to vote for the President’s health care reform, acknowledged the tension between pressing for progressive reform and falling into a trap laid by the opposition:

“With three years left in the Obama Presidency we have to continue to encourage him, but we’ve got to be careful that we don’t play into those who want to destroy his presidency and say, you know, the birthers and others who say he should never have been President to begin with.  There is a tension that exists. . . .  we have to be very careful about how much we attack this president even as we disagree with him because we may play into those who just want to destroy his presidency.”  (Democracy Now!, March 18, 2010 (radio interview with Amy Goodman))

Careful indeed!  It’s about time.

What can Canada teach us about banking regulation?

By Marc Seltzer and Leslie Schreiber; originally published as “Northern Light” on June 19, 2009, in Commonweal Magazine and at Commonwealmagazine.org.

US Regulatory Reform Follows Canadian Model

. .

Amid the greatest worldwide financial meltdown since the Great Depression, there have been few examples of sound financial management and regulation. Public authorities have had to provide billions of dollars to support ailing institutions and have acknowledged far-reaching gaps in public oversight. Responding to the disastrous bubble and bust, the Obama administration is calling for comprehensive reform. International leaders have even gone so far as to call for the creation of a world financial regulator.

U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, while not going that far, is asking Congress to grant the Treasury broad oversight authority for virtually all financial institutions, and a mandate to monitor systemic risk. Additional proposals seek to insure that financial instruments, such as credit-default swaps, are subject to federal regulation. While Congress will ultimately be responsible for crafting legislation, Geithner’s proposals provide a road map for a new financial order, in his words-“not modest repairs at the margin, but new rules of the game.”

The economic crisis has tested the stability of financial systems across the international community. The results differ widely, from Iceland’s near-bankruptcy to Canada’s remarkable financial health and insulation from risk. Beyond the private gains and losses, the crisis has revealed strengths and weaknesses of different regulatory environments. Remarkably, not a single major Canadian financial institution has needed a bailout. In March, the International Monetary Fund praised Canada’s banks for their “remarkable stability amid the global turbulence.” Howard Kaplow, an investment executive and director of financial services in Montreal, noted that Canadians “tend to be more conservative, but we also have a more restrictive financial authority with tougher rules to follow.” The IMF agrees, commending Canada’s “strong regulatory and supervisory framework.”

In this light one may ask how Secretary Geithner’s proposals for regulatory reform measure up against the Canadian model. Are the Obama administration’s efforts to monitor systemic risk and regulate all substantial financial entities and instruments in line with the Canadian approach?

In contrast to Canada’s conservatism, the U.S. system has gone through a period of “irrational exuberance.” Over the past twenty years, Congress deregulated financial industries in order to maximize business opportunity. New financial instruments, markets, and conglomerates were unleashed without oversight. In a recent debate over the causes of the crisis, New York University Professor Nouriel Roubini (nicknamed “Dr. Doom” for having predicted the current crisis) argued that, “deregulation occurred too fast and in ways that did not provide prudential regulation for provision of the financial system.”

The dominant political ethos was trust in free markets, competition, and modest regulation-even self-regulation. Where regulators did act, they followed a framework that called for distinct regulators in compartmentalized markets. The FDIC has been highly praised for its success at handling the closing of failed banks, but neither the FDIC nor the Federal Reserve had authority to intervene when an investment bank or insurer acted unwisely or teetered on the brink of bankruptcy.

In the end, the failures were systemic and pervasive. They could not be limited to one sector of the financial system, nor were they detected by any existing regulatory agency. In warning that the problems would not respond to a quick fix, President Barack Obama observed that the crisis “didn’t result from any one action or decision. It took many years and many failures to lead us here.”

New regulations were contemplated long before Secretary Geithner was confirmed. Former Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and the General Accounting Office oversaw substantial groundwork in 2008, but it now falls to Geithner to finish the job. While Geithner is promoting a more comprehensive regulatory regime, the proposals have been developed by financial and market experts and insiders who believe in free-market capitalism. They do not wish to stifle financial innovation. Instead, the aim is to protect the overall system while allowing risk-taking activity to continue. This approach is in line with the Canadian system, where, despite strong regulatory authority, the financial sector has prospered. Today, five of the country’s banks are among the top fifty banks in the world. Ten years ago none of them was.

The lead financial regulatory authority in Canada is the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI), currently headed by Julie Dickson. She chairs the Financial Institutions Supervisory Committee, which has broad authority to monitor systemic risk and, for that purpose, brings together regulators who oversee market stability, risk-management, and business practices from across the financial economy. The OSFI mandate covers “all banks, along with federally regulated property, casualty, and life insurers, and trust and loan companies, plus about 10 percent of private pension plans” according to OSFI spokesman Jean Paul Duval. If any of the institutions “raise a red flag, the OSFI can implement a range of disciplinary measures, affecting everything from bank capitalization to controlling assets, and even getting directly involved in business planning.” Indirectly, this also includes securities firms, which are 70-percent bank-owned in Canada (for example, RBC Dominion Securities is part of the Royal Bank of Canada). The OSFI oversees 450 banks and insurers, and approximately 1,350 private pension plans. Its authority, while not reaching all financial institutions (hedge funds are not regulated by the OSFI), is fairly comprehensive and is foundational for the soundness of the Canadian system.

Secretary Geithner told Congress in March that the oversight he was proposing “would include bank and thrift holding companies and holding companies that control broker-dealers, insurance companies, and futures commission merchants, or any other financial firm posing substantial risk” (emphasis added). Not every financial entity reaches the size and significance to affect systemic risk, but Geithner wants to avoid a system where the legal form of an entity can be used to shield it from regulation. A key component of meaningful oversight is the ability of the regulator to set standards for institutional risk management. Geithner is asking Congress for authority to increase capital requirements, to restrict leverage ratios, and to enact additional prudential rules.

In Canada, the OSFI has substantial experience with such oversight. According to Duval, since its creation in 1987, the OSFI “has always been vigilant in the development of its risk-management practices.” Capital requirements for Canadian banks have been held at 7 percent, while the global average is closer to 4 percent. Similarly, Canada’s bank-leverage ratio has been kept under twenty-to-one, while international bank leverage ratios were thirty-to-one and even forty-to-one. OSFI Superintendent Dickson remarked in November 2008, “We have seen how strong capital cushions in Canada have paid off to the benefit of our institutions and overall financial system.”

Canadian institutions were not free from risk-taking or even from exposure to subprime loans from the United States, but strong capital and leverage standards kept the damage from overwhelming Canada’s banks, let alone destabilizing the economy. In addition, Canadian banks generally still maintain the mortgage portfolios of loans they originate, retaining direct knowledge and responsibility for their management. These conservative practices reinforce sound regulation, and vice versa.

Canadian regulators give special attention to larger, “too big to fail” organizations. Duval explains that “OSFI utilizes a risk-based methodology, where institutions that we believe are operating in a riskier manner are subject to increased supervision. That said, the larger institutions will be operating in larger parts of the market, so [they] would naturally receive greater attention…and can be subject to different supervisory requirements.”

Similarly, the U.S. federal regulator proposed by Geithner will have the power to step in and manage problems when institutions fail to meet prudential standards or find themselves in financial difficulty. Special consideration would be given to entities deemed “too big to fail.” Geithner is asking Congress for the flexibility to intervene where there is risk to the wider economy. He has already intervened with a few of the big banks. Recent “stress tests” resulted in some banks being required to raise capital, although banks could choose whether to seek private or public funds.

Critics have called for regulations that would cap the size or restrict the legal structure of financial institutions. However, noting that other countries have allowed hybrid entities such as Canada’s banking and securities conglomerates, Geithner appears to trust that oversight will protect the system, and that private decision making should be allowed as much leeway as possible. The changes he proposes will require legislation. Under his lead, the Obama administration should be pushing hard for a substantial increase in federal regulatory authority. What might have been politically impossible before the crisis is now high on the legislative agenda. In addition, the chairman of the Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke, has spoken in concert with the administration. While Congress will take a significant role in designing new regulation and is not likely to rubber-stamp the administration’s proposals, momentum is strong for the creation of comprehensive financial reform. The success of the regulatory system across the border should inspire both humility and hope.